

# New Research on Tobacco Taxation and Implications for Smokefree New Zealand

Frank J. Chaloupka, University of Illinois at Chicago ASPIRE2025, University of Otago, Wellington, New Zealand 9 October, 2015

# Overview

- Tobacco tax structure & tobacco use
- Price elasticity of cigarette demand
- Other tobacco products
- E-cigarette demand
- ANDS taxation
- Implications for Smokefree New Zealand

Mix of global and US-focused research



# **Many collaborators**

- Jidong Huang
- Ce Shang
- Jamie Chriqui
- Xin Xu
- John Tauras
- Michael Pesko
- David Merriman
- Camille Gourdet
- Hillary DeLong
- Geoffrey Fong
- Ken Warner
- David Sweanor
- And many many more.....



# And many funders

- National Cancer Institute, as part of NCI's State and Community Tobacco Control Research Program
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
- National Cancer Institute, as part of support for the International Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation Study (ITC)
- Canadian Institutes for Health Research
- World Health Organization
- Bloomberg Philanthropies
- Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
- And others.....

"Sugar, rum, and **tobacco,** are commodities which are no where necessaries of life, which are become objects of almost universal consumption, and which are therefore **extremely proper subjects of taxation."** 

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations, 1776




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#### **Tax Structure**

## WHO's Best Practices in Tobacco Taxation

- Simpler is better
  - Complex tax structures more difficult to administer
  - Greater opportunities for tax evasion and tax avoidance under complex tax structures
  - Where existing structure is more complex, simplify over time with goal of achieving single uniform tax



## WHO's Best Practices in Tobacco Taxation

- Rely more on specific tobacco excises as the share of total excises in prices increases
  - Greater public health impact of specific excises given reduced opportunities for switching down in response to tax/price increases
  - Sends clear message that all brands are equally harmful
  - Where existing tax is ad valorem, adopt a specific tax and increase reliance on specific tax over time



## FCTC Article 6 Guidelines

Section 3 – Tobacco taxation systems – Recommendation:

"Parties should implement the simplest and most efficient system that meets their public health and fiscal needs, and taking into account their national circumstances. Parties should consider implementing specific or mixed excise systems with a minimum specific tax floor, as these systems have considerable advantages over purely ad valorem systems."

"Parties should establish coherent long-term policies on their tobacco taxation structure and monitor on a regular basis including targets for their tax rates, in order to achieve their public health and fiscal objectives within a certain period of time."

"Tax rates should be monitored, increased or adjusted on a regular basis, potentially annually, taking into account inflation and income growth developments in order to reduce consumption of tobacco products."



# Excise Systems for Cigarettes 2014


	Number of countries
Total covered	186
Specific excise only	61
Ad valorem excise only	46
Mixture of both excises	61
No Excise	18



Source: WHO GTCR, 2015

#### **Excise Systems for Cigarettes**

CHANGES IN EXCISE TAX STRUCTURES, 2008-2014






Source: WHO GTCR, 2015

## **Excise Systems for Cigarettes**


GREATER RELIANCE ON SPECIFIC EXCISE WITHIN MIXED TAX SYSTEMS, 2008–2014



Source: WHO GTCR, 2015

## Average price and excise tax by tax structure, 2014

WEIGHTED AVERAGE PRICES AND TAXES PER PACK BY TAX STRUCTURE



Note: Averages are weighted by WHO estimates of number of current cigarette smokers in each country.

Prices are expressed in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted dollars or international dollars to account for differences in the purchasing power across countries. Based on 53 high-income, 98 middle-income and 29 low-income countries with data on price of most sold brand, excise and other taxes, and PPP conversion factors.



#### **Tiered Tax Systems**


- 37 of 168 countries with cigarette excise tax employ a tiered tax system
- Differential taxes based on:
  - Prices
  - Product characteristics
    - Filter vs. non-filter
    - Length
    - Type of product
    - Type of tobacco
    - Packaging
    - Weight
  - Producer characteristics




#### Tax Structure & Prices: Descriptive Evidence from the ITC Countries

- Most recent wave of ITC data from 16 countries.
- Distributions of self-reported prices:
  - E.g., Interquartile range (IQR)-to-Median ratio, max-min range to mean ratio
- Tax Structure measures:
  - Tiered ad valorem: Bangladesh
  - Tiered mixed: China, Brazil (2012-)
  - Tiered specific: India, Brazil (Prior to 2012)
  - Ad valorem: Mexico (prior to 2009), Thailand
  - Mixed: UK, Germany, France, Netherlands, Malaysia, Mexico
  - Specific: US, Australia, Canada, Uruguay, Mauritius,





#### Tax Structure & Prices: Descriptive Evidence from the ITC Countries





International Tobacco Co Policy Evaluation Project




#### Tax Structure & Prices: Descriptive Evidence from the ITC Countries

- Findings:
  - Compared to countries with specific tax structures, countries with other tax systems tend to have price distributions with greater variability
  - Countries with tiered tax structures have greater variability around the median price
  - Countries with tiered tax structures have price distributions more heavily skewed towards lower prices
  - Countries with mixed systems that rely more heavily on ad valorem than on specific component have greater variability around the median price






#### **Similar Evidence from GATS & NATS**





#### **Similar Evidence from GATS & NATS**



#### **Tax Structure & Prices: Empirical Evidence from the ITC Countries**

- Data
  - ITC data from 17 countries, 2004-2013.
  - Price variability constructed using self-reported prices:
    - Ratio of price gap between higher and lower prices to the median price, e.g. interquartile range (IQR)-to-median ratio.
  - Tax Structure measures:
    - Percentage of specific component among total taxes and a dichotomous indicator for tiered structure
    - Dichotomous measures for specific tiered, ad valorem specific, ad valorem tiered, mixed specific, and mixed tiered structure.
  - Controls: year fixed effects, EU dummy, sub-national tax dummy (US, UK, India).





#### **Tax Structure & Prices: Empirical Evidence from the ITC Countries**

Country	Tax Base	Tax Rates
US		
Canada		
Uruguay		
Australia	Specific	Uniform
Mauritius		
Republic of		
Korea		
India		Tiered
Thailand	Ad Valorem	Uniform
Bangladesh		Tiered
China		Tiered
Malaysia	Mixed (specific + ad valorem)	
EU		Uniform
Mexico	Switched from ad valorem to mixed in 2009	
Brazil	Switched from specific to mixed in 2012	Tiered





#### **Tax Structure & Prices: Empirical Evidence from the ITC Countries**

- Findings
  - Complicated tax structures that depart from a uniform specific structure are associated with greater price variability.
  - A 10% increase in the specific component of total excises is associated with a 2.8-4.3% lower price variability.
  - A tiered structure is associated with a 61-147% higher price variability.
  - Countries that impose a specific uniform tax structure, that increase their reliance on specific excise taxes, and/or switch from tiered to uniform tax rates, will reduce price variability.





#### Tax Structure & Cigarette Smoking: Evidence from the ITC Countries

- Data:
  - ITC 17 countries, 2004-2013
  - Aggregate self-reported cigarette consumption
  - Control for:
    - Economic conditions (real GDP per capita)
    - Tobacco control policy environment (2010 "MPOWER" tobacco control composite scores by WHO)
    - Year fixed effects





#### Tax Structure & Cigarette Smoking: Evidence from the ITC Countries

#### • Findings:

- A tiered tax structure is associated with greater cigarette consumption.
- A 10% increase in the share of the specific component among total excise taxes is associated with 6% lower cigarette consumption.






# **Tax Structure - Summary**

- Growing evidence on the importance of how cigarettes are taxed
  - Uniform tax structures have greater impact on prices, price variation, and smoking behavior
  - Specific excise taxes have greater impact on prices, price variation, and smoking behavior





# **Price Elasticity of Cigarette Demand**

#### **Cigarette Price & Consumption** Hungary, 1990-2011, Inflation Adjusted




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
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#### Sources: EIU, ERC, and World Bank


#### **Adult Prevalence & Price, Brazil**



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


#### Cigarette Prices and Cessation US States & DC, 2009




Source: BRFSS, Tax Burden on Tobacco, 2010, and author's calculations

#### Cigarette Price & Youth Smoking Prevalence High School Seniors, United States, 1991-2013



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#### **Price, Consumption & Lung Cancer, France**





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#### What We Know

- Increases in taxes that increase cigarette prices:
  - Decrease overall cigarette smoking
  - Reduce adult prevalence by inducing cessation induces current smokers to quit,
  - Deter re-initiation
  - Prevent youth uptake
  - Reduce consumption among continuing users
  - Lead to other changes in tobacco use behaviors
    - Brand/product choices, purchasing behaviors, tax avoidance, etc.




#### What We Need to Know


- How the effect of price increases changes as prices increase (potential nonlinear impact)
- Whether the impact of a price increase differs by the size of price increases (asymmetric impact)
- How opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion affect price elasticity estimates



#### State Cigarette Excise Tax Rates – February 2015



### **Estimated State Cigarette 'Importing' and 'Exporting', 2010-11**




# **Nonlinearities in Price Elasticity**


- Two sets of analyses in progress:
  - Aggregate analysis of state level tax-paid cigarette sales
  - Individual level analysis of cigarette smoking prevalence and consumption using data from multiple waves of the Tobacco Use Supplement to the Current Population Survey
    - Also emphasize how opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion can
       affect estimates of price elasticity
- All analyses control for other tobacco control policies and variety of other factors that influence cigarette demand



## **Results – Aggregate Data**




### **Price Elasticities - Prevalence**






## **Price Elasticities - Consumption**



### **Total Price Elasticities**



# **Nonlinearities in Price Elasticity**


- Conclusions:
  - Price elasticity increases as price increases
    - 10% increase in price will result in larger reductions in smoking when price is higher
  - But marginal effect of price falls as price rises
    - Same price increase (e.g. \$1.00 per pack) will have smaller impact as price rises



# Asymmetric Responses to Price

- Analyses in early stages:
  - Same aggregate and individual-level data
  - Early results suggest that large price increases have disproportionately larger impact than series of small increases
    - Shock value?
    - More difficult for industry to offset?






# **Other Tobacco Product Taxation**

### What We Need to Know

- How do governments tax other tobacco products (OTPs)?
- How different OTP tax structures affect the retail prices for these products?
- How do OTP taxes/prices affect prevalence, consumption, sales, initiation, and cessation (own price elasticities)?
- How do differences in taxes/prices across products affect use of different products (cross price elasticities)?



# **OTP Chartbook**



#### **Tobacco Product Taxation:**

An Analysis of State Tax Schemes Nationwide, Selected Years, 2005-2014

Camille K. Gourdet, JD, MA | Jamie F. Chriqui, PhD, MHS | Julien Leider, MS Hillary DeLong, J.D. | Colin Goodman, J.D. | Frank J. Chaloupka, PhD.

August 2015

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### **Section 1: Introduction** Purpose of the Chartbook Data Sources and Limitations Organization of the Report Section 2: Policy Areas Covered OTP Selection and Definitions Tax Structures Section 3: Nat'l Overview of State OTP Rates and Structures Section 4: Individual State Profiles How to Read the State Profile Pages Section 5: Conclusions Section 6: References Appendix

### **OTP State Data Profile Page Sample**

#### California

Table 1: Other Tobacco Product Taxation

OTP Taxed? No Yes ✓ If yes, which products are taxed as of January 1, 2014?

If yes, which products are taxed	d as of Jan	✓ Yes Blank No Not Applicable/Addressed				
Product	Taxed? Type of Tax		How Defined?	How Taxed?	Rate Change Since 2005?	
Cigars	~	Ad Valorem	Specific	With OTPs	With OTPs	Since 2005?
Cigarillos	~	~		With OTPs	With OTPs	÷
Little Cigars	~		~	With OTPs	Cigarette	Tax Type Changed
Pipe Tobacco	~	~		With OTPs	With OTPs	¥
Roll-Your-Own Tobacco	~	~		With OTPs	With OTPs	¥
Dry Snuff	~	✓		With OTPs	With OTPs	¥
Moist Snuff	✓	✓		With OTPs	With OTPs	Ŷ
Snus	~	✓		With OTPs	With OTPs	¥
Smokeless Tobacco Generally	~	✓		With OTPs	With OTPs	Ŷ
Dissolvables	~	✓		With OTPs	With OTPs	¥
E-cigarettes	No					Not applicable

♦ Rate Decreased 🛧 Rate Increased ↔ No Change

#### Table 2: Summary of Cigarette and OTP Tax Rates, Selected Years, 2005-2014

Product	2005	2008	2011	2014	
Cigarettes	\$0.87/20§	\$0.87/20 §	\$0.87/20 §	\$0.87/20 §	
Cigars	46.76% WC ∆	46.76% WC ∆	33.02% WC A	29.82% WC A	
Cigarillos	46.76% WC ∆	46.76% WC △	33.02% WC 🛆	29.82% WC A	
Little Cigars	46.76% WC ∆	\$0.87/20 §	\$0.87/20 §	\$0.87/20 §	
Pipe Tobacco	46.76% WC ∆	45.13% WC △	33.02% WC 🛆	29.82% WC 🛆	
Roll-Your-Own Tobacco	46.76% WC ∆	45.13% WC △	33.02% WC △	29.82% WC 🛆	
Dry Snuff	46.76% WC ∆	45.13% WC △	33.02% WC △	29.82% WC 🛆	
Moist Snuff	46.76% WC ∆	45.13% WC ∆	33.02% WC ∆	29.82% WC A	
Snus	46.76% WC ∆	45.13% WC 🛆	33.02% WC 🛆	29.82% WC 🛆	
Smokeless Tobacco Generally	48.89% WC Δ	45.13% WC ∆	33.02% WC ∆	29.82% WC 🛆	
Dissolvables	48.89% WC △	45.13% WC △	33.02% WC 🛆	29.82% WC 🛆	
E-cigarettes					

△ Ad Valorem; § Specific; - Not taxed; WC=Wholesale Cost.


#### Wholesale Cost

WC "... the cost of tobacco products to the distributor prior to any discounts or trade allowances." (CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 300 17)



Tobacco Product Taxation Across the States | www.tobacconomics.org | Twitter: @tobacconomics

### **OTP Fact Sheets**





Twitter: @tobacconomics

### **OTP State Profiles Sheets**

OTP Taxed?	Tobacco Product 7		✓ Yes. How Defined? With OTPs With OTPs With OTPs With OTPs	Bast No N How Taxed? With OTPs With OTPs Cigaretts	ot Applicable/Addressee Rate Change Since 2005?
If yes, which produ Product Cigars Cigarillos Little Cigars Pipe Tobacco	ucts are taxed as of Januar Taxed?	Type of Tax sd Volorem v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v	How Defined? With OTPs With OTPs With OTPs	How Taxed? With OTPs With OTPs	Rate Change Since 2005?
Cigars Cigarillos Little Cigars Pipe Tobacco	× × × ×	kd Valorem Specific ✓	Defined? With OTPs With OTPs With OTPs	Taxed? With OTPs With OTPs	Since 2005?
Cigarillos Little Cigars Pipe Tobacco	✓ ✓ ✓	* * * *	With OTPs With OTPs With OTPs	With OTPs With OTPs	
Cigarillos Little Cigars Pipe Tobacco	4	* * *	With OTPs With OTPs	With OTPs	
Pipe Tobacco	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	4		Cigarette	
Pipe Tobacco		4	With OTPs		Tax Type Chang
Roll-Your-Own To	bacco 🗸	10000		With OTPs	+
	A.H.M.	10000	With OTPs	With OTPs	+
	ATTA	1	With OTPs	Stand-alone	Tax Type Change
	ATT AN		With OTPs	Stand-alone	Tax Type Change
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	And The All	dr.	With OTPs	With OTPs	+
	1771 1 2020				Not applicable
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1	Zone			1.17	
	1	x Rate	s, selecte	d Years, 20	005-2014
🖌 Yes 🖉	i No Not Applicable/Addre			2011	2014
fTax How	How Rate Chan	\$2.75/20 §		4.35/20 §	\$4.35/20 §
	Taxed? Since 200	COD WE -		75% WP △	75% WP △
	With OTPs 🔹 🕈	ST% WP A		5% WP ∆ 4.35/20 §	75% WP ∆ \$4,35/20 §
	With OTPs 🔶	STIG WP A		4.35/20 9 5% WP ∆	\$4.35/20.9 75% WP ∆
	Cigarette 🔹	37% WP A		5%WP∆	75% WP 4
	With OTPs +	37% WP A	S	2.00/02 §	\$2.00/02 §
	With OTPs 🔹	37% WP A		12.00/oz §	\$2.00/0E §
	With OTPs +	37% WP A		2.00/02§	\$2.00/0Z §
	Smokeless +	3776-WP △	2	5% WP ∆	75% WP ∆
	Smokeless +			-	
	Smokeless 🕈				
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Rate Decreased	🕈 Rate Increased 🛛 😝 No Ch	inge icco product	s to a distributor,	before the allowand	ce of any discount, trad
		(70)			
Tax Rates, Selected Y	ears, 2005-2014				
2008 20	2014				
\$1.51/20 \$ \$2.51					
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30% WP ∆ 30% '					
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bacco..." (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 64C, § 6) \*Underlined language indicates the unit of analysis

Tobacco Product Taxation Across the States | scare.tobacconomics.org | Twitter: @tobacconomics

#### California Table 1: Other Tobacco Product Taxation OTP Taxed? No Yes If yes, which products are taxed as of January 1, 2014? Taxed? Type of Ta roduct Cigars Cigarillos Little Cigars Pipe Tobacco Roll-Your-Own Tobacco Dry Snuff Moist Snuff Snus Smokeless Tobacco Generally W Dissolvables E-cigarettes Table 1: Table 2: Summary of Cigaret OTP Taxed roduct If ues, whi Cigarettes Cigars Cigarillos Cigars Little Cigars Cigarillo Pipe Tobacco Roll-Your-Own Tobacco Dry Snuff Little Ciga Pipe Toba Moist Snuff Roll-You Snus Dry Snuff Smokeless Tobacco Generally Dissolvables Moist Snu E-cigarettes Snus Smokeless Tobacco Generally Ad Valorem; § Specific; - Not taxed; WC-Wh Dissolvables

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	Taxed?	Type of Ad Valorem	f Tax Specific	How Defined?	How Taxed?	Rate Char Since 200
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s	1	1		With OTPs	With OTPs	4
ars	1		1	Stand-alone	Cigarette	Tax Type Cha
acco	×	1		With OTPs	With OTPs	4
r-Own Tobacco	1		4	Cigarotte	Cigarette	Tax Type Cha
r	1	1		With OTPs	With OTPs	4
uff	1		1	With OTPs	Moist Snuff	Tax Type Cha
	1		1	With OTPs	Moist Snuff	Tax Type Che

Tax Type Changed

4

✓ Yes Blank No -- Not/

With OTPs With OTPs

With OTPs

With OTPa With OTPs Cigarette

With OTPs

With OTPs

With OTPs

With OTPs

Wholesale Cost WC ... the cost of tobacco product

Tobacco Product Taxation Across

E-cigarettes

🔹 Rate Decreased 🔶 Rate Increased 😝 No Change

With OTPs With OTPs

With OTPs

Not applicable

With OTPs

Table 2: Summary of Cigarette and OTP Tax Rates, Selected Years, 2005-2014

Product	2005	2008	2011	2014
Cigarettes	\$1.425/20 §	\$2.025/20 §	\$3.025/20 §	\$3.025/20 \$
Cigars	129.42% TSP A	75% TSP $\Delta$	95% TSP △	95% TSP A
Cigarillos	129.42% TSP 🛆	75% TSP 🛆	95% TSP △	95% TSP △
Little Cigars	129-42% TSP A	75% TSP $\Delta$	\$3.025/20§	\$3.025/20 \$
Pipe Tobacco	129.42% TSP 🛆	75% TSP △	95% TSP △	95% TSP △
Roll-Your-Own Tobacco	129.42% TSP A	75% TSP ∆	95% TSP 4	\$1.68/oz§
Dry Snuff	129.42% TSP A	75% TSP ∆	95% TSP △	95% TSP 4
Moist Snuff	129.42% TSP A	75% TSP 🛆	\$2.526 ca §	«\$2.526 ea §
Snus	129.42% TSP A	75% TSP ∆	\$2.105/02 §	\$2.105/02 §
Smokeless Tobacco Generally	129.42% TSP A	75% TSP 🛆	95% TSP △	95% TSP 🛆
Dissolvables	-		95% TSP △	95% TSP △
E-cigarettes	++		**	

lot taxed: TSP-Taxable Sales Price: ea-each: az-aunce. «'On each a the transmission of the second second


axable Sales Price TSP the actual price for which the taxpayer purchased the tobacco products" (WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 82.26.010)

Tobacco Product Taxation Across the States | searce.tobacconomics.org | Twitter: @tobaccono




Twitter: @tobacconomics


### Number of States Taxing Each of the 11 OTPs (January 1, 2005 and 2014)



### **OTP Tax Rates**




### **OTP Tax Rates**







### **OTP Tax Rates**




### **Nielsen Store Scanner Data**




### Impact of tax structure change on prices



### Impact of tax structure change on prices






Note: 1.Average Price Calculated Per Unit.


### **OTP Demand**

- Preliminary findings based on analysis of Nielsen data:
  - Strong own-price effects; generally more responsive to price than cigarette demand
  - Generally consistent cross-price effects for like products
    - e.g. loose tobacco, little cigars, cigarettes are substitutes
  - Mixed findings for cross-price effects among different products
    - Substitution vs. dual use?






## **E-Cigarette Demand**



### **Reusable ENDS Sale Volume and Price, US 2010 - 2014**



### **E-Cigarette Prices & Sales**

- Huang, et al., *Tobacco Control*, 2014
  - Overall sales of e-cigarettes are sensitive to price changes
  - A 10% increase in price reduces sales of disposable ecigarettes by approximately 12%, and by about 19% for reusable e-cigarettes.
  - Sales of disposable e-cigarettes were higher in markets with stronger SFA policies.
  - No consistent statistical significant relationship between cigarette prices and e-cigarette sales.
  - Increasing reusable e-cigarette price will lead to an increase in disposable e-cigarette sales.



### **Own Price Elasticities**

Model	E-Cig Re	N	E-Cię	g Disposable	N	
<sup>(1)</sup> FDM CV	-1.190***	[-1.709,-0.670]	803	-0.968	[-2.205,0.270]	900
<sup>(2)</sup> FDM CV	-1.176***	[-1.702,-0.649]	803	-1.157**	[-2.261,-0.0538]	900
<sup>(1)</sup> FDM	-0.171	[-0.561,0.219]	423	-1.097	[-2.536,0.343]	515
<sup>(2)</sup> FDM	-0.141	[-0.522,0.240]	423	-1.381*	[-2.806,0.0447]	515
(1)CV	-2.635***	[-3.569,-1.701]	380	-0.963	[-2.878,0.951]	385
(2)CV	-2.636***	[-3.595,-1.678]	380	-0.946	[-2.924,1.033]	385

(1) Controls for year and quarter fixed effects and store dummy for FDM CV models. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. 95% confidence intervals in the brackets. (2) Additional controls for tobacco control funding, smoke free air index, and average cigarette tax rate (except for Cigarette set and aggregated US Market sets)



### **Cross Price Elasticities**

Model	E-Cig Rechargeable		ig Rechargeable N E-Cig Disposable		Cig Disposable	N
<sup>(1)</sup> FDM CV	1.307	[-2.745,5.360]	803	-0.373	[-3.362,2.617]	900
<sup>(2)</sup> FDM CV	1.175	[-2.858,5.209]	803	-0.174	[-2.962,2.614]	900
<sup>(1)</sup> FDM	-0.267	[-4.600,4.067]	423	-3.376	[-7.550,0.797]	515
<sup>(2)</sup> FDM	-0.243	[-4.555 <i>,</i> 4.069]	423	-3.358	[-7.645,0.930]	515
(1)CV	2.486	[-4.847,9.818]	380	4.237	[-0.970,9.443]	385
<sup>(2)</sup> CV	2.236	[-5.178,9.651]	380	4.037*	[-0.789 <i>,</i> 8.862]	385

(1) Controls for year and quarter fixed effects and store dummy for FDM CV models. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. 95% confidence intervals in the brackets.

(2) Additional controls for tobacco control funding and smoke free air index



# **Impact of e-cig entry on NRT**

	Disposabl	e e-cigs	Reusable	e-cigs
	NRT patch	NRT gum	NRT patch	NRT gum
A. Quarter first differenced model				
Ordinary least square	-0.0506	-0.170*	0.0908	0.0507
, ,	-0.0599	-0.0866	-0.0614	-0.0945
Observations	573	649	573	649
Two-stage least square	-0.408***	-2.053***	-0.0923	-3.597**
<u> </u>	-0.153	-0.67	-0.31	-1.589
Instrument F-statistics	45.84	40.22	35.64	39.6
B. Linear year trend model				
Ordinary least square	-0.0566	-0.170**	-0.0423	-0.0516
	-0.0563	-0.0803	-0.0408	-0.108
Observations	629	740	629	740
Two-stage least square	-0.428***	-0.868**	-0.754***	-1.337**
	-0.133	-0.382	-0.287	-0.658
Instrument F-statistics	22.17	28.72	6.466	9.783

Notes: Each coefficient represents a separate regression. NRT stands for nicotine replacement therapies. Also controlled for natural log of own price, natural log of price of combustible tobacco products (cigarettes, cigarillo, little cigar, cigar), smoking-free air index, year dummies, quarter dummies, market dummies, store dummy, and a constant. Standard errors in parentheses were clustered at market level.

# **E-Cigarette Prices & Sales**

- Stoklosa, Drope & Chaloupka (under review)
  - 2011-2014 monthly data on e-cigarette sales in six EU countries (Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, and UK)
  - Own price elasticities range from -0.83 to -0.87
  - E-cigarette sales generally positively associated with cigarette prices, but mostly not statistically significant



- Huang et al. (under review)
- Methods:
  - Nationally representative 2013 online survey
    - 7,522 U.S. adults from GFK's Knowledge Online Panel.
  - Survey data were linked with Nielsen e-cigarette retail prices
    - separately for disposalbe and reusable e-cigarette
  - Weighted survey logistic regression analysis
    - ever use and current use
    - Control for cigarette price, demographics, and socioeconomics



### **Descriptive Statistics**

Variable	Ν	%/Mean	(95% CI)
E-Cigarette Outcome Measures			
Ever Use	3910	14.8	(14.0 , 15.5)
Current Use	1605	5.1	(4.7 , 5.5)
Tobacco Control Policy			
No comprehensive smoking bans	4156	26.9	(26.0 , 27.8)
Smoking bans at restaurants, bars, or private workplaces	5110	30.9	(30.0, 31.8)
Smoking bans at restaurants, bars, and private workplaces	8241	42.2	(41.2 , 43.1)
E-Cigarette Price Measures (Mean Price in U.S. Dollars)			
Disposable e-cigarettes	15491	8.74	(8.72 , 8.76)
Rechargeable e-cigarettes	15161	27.0	(26.81 , 27.13)
Disposable e-cigarettes: Top selling brand	14732	9.9	(9.88, 9.91)
Rechargeable e-cigarettes: Top selling brand	13921	57.2	(56.95 , 57.46)
Marlboro Price (Mean Price in U.S. Dollars)	15491	5.8	(5.80 , 5.85)



### **Results: E-cigarette Ever Use**

	Average Disposable Price	Average Rechargeable Price	Top Selling Disposable Brand Price	Top Selling Rechargeable Brand Price	Average Disposable Price	Average Rechargeable Price	Top Selling Disposable Brand Price	Top Selling Rechargeable Brand Price
Estimated E-cigarette Own Price Elasticity	-0.911***	-	-0.978**	_	-0.852**	-	-0.811*	-
	(-1.556 , -0.266)		(-1.888 , -0.069)		(-1.515 , -0.189)		(-1.769, 0.146)	
Odd Ratios:								
Price of E-cigarettes	0.886***	1.006	0.891**	1.002	0.893**	1.006	0.909*	1.002
	(0.813 , 0.965)	(0.998 , 1.014)	(0.801,0.992)	(0.996 , 1.007)	(0.817, 0.975)	(0.998 , 1.014)	(0.812, 1.017)	(0.997, 1.008
Marlboro Price	-	-	-	-	0.970	0.965	0.965	0.953
					(0.911 , 1.034)	(0.905 , 1.028)	(0.904 , 1.029)	(0.892,1.01
No Smoking Bans Reference Category) Smoking Bans in								
Restaurants, Bars, or Private Workplaces	-	-	-	-	1.050	1.014	1.021	1.023
·					(0.873 , 1.263)	(0.846 , 1.215)	(0.843 , 1.237)	(0.846 , 1.23
Smoking Bans in Restaurants, Bars, AND					- · ·	- · · · ·	- · · ·	
Private Workplaces	-	-	-	-	0.897	0.879	0.893	0.898
					(0.745 , 1.080)	(0.730 , 1.057)	(0.738 , 1.079)	(0.742, 1.08)
Observations	15,449	15,120	14,691	13,882	15,436	15,107	14,681	13,872
	13,449	13,120	14,091	13,002	13,430	15,107	14,001	13,872

95% confidence intervals in parentheses All models controlled for individual level demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1

#### **Results: E-cigarette Current Use**

	Average Disposable Price	Average Rechargeable Price	Top Selling Disposable Brand Price	Top Selling Rechargeable Brand Price	Average Disposable Price	Average Rechargeable Price	Top Selling Disposable Brand Price	Top Selling Rechargeable Brand Price
Estimated E-cigarette Own Price Elasticity	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Odds Ratios:								
Price of E-cigarettes	1.023	1.01	0.937	0.999	1.025	1.011	0.932	0.999
	(0.913 , 1.146)	(0.999 , 1.021)	(0.785 , 1.118)	(0.992, 1.007)	(0.911 , 1.153)	(1.000 , 1.022)	(0.771 , 1.127)	(0.991 , 1.007)
Marlboro Price	-	-	-	-	1.007	1.012	1.008	1.005
No Smoking Bans (Reference					(0.919 , 1.103)	(0.925 , 1.107)	(0.921 , 1.103)	(0.916 , 1.102)
Category) Smoking Bans in Restaurants, Bars, or Private Workplaces	-	-	-	-	1.040	1.050	1.110	1.106
					(0.807, 1.339)	(0.820,1.344)	(0.853 , 1.445)	(0.853 , 1.433)
Smoking Bans in Restaurants, Bars, AND Private Workplaces	-	-	-	-	0.860	0.853	0.868	0.857
					(0.665 , 1.111)	(0.656 , 1.108)	(0.666 , 1.132)	(0.658 , 1.116)
Observations	15,449	15,120	14,691	13,882	15,436	15,107	14,681	13,872

95% confidence intervals in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Estimated price elasticities were not reported given none of the estimated odds ratios for e-cigarette prices were statistically significant.

All models controlled for individual level demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.



### Summary:

- 15% of respondents reported ever using e-cigarettes
- 5.1% reported current use
- young adults and cigarette smokers had the highest odds of both ever use and current use.
- Higher disposable e-cigarette prices correlated with lower odds of ever use
  - estimated own price elasticity ranges from -0.81 to -0.98
- Neither rechargeable e-cigarette price nor combustible cigarette price was found associated with e-cigarette ever use
- No significant interactions were discovered between ecigarette or cigarette price and e-cigarette current use.



In progress:

- 2014 Monitoring the Future data on youth use of e-cigarettes
- Nielsen scanner price data
- Preliminary estimates suggest very large effects of price on youth
- Next steps: add 2015 data



#### **Impact of Price on E-cigarette Use**


Policy Implications:

- Taxes on disposable and rechargeable e-cigarettes will reduce sales
- Taxes on disposable e-cigarettes likely to reduce ecigarette ever use (trial use and experimentation)

Research Needs:

- Better measures of e-cigarette costs, which distinguish initial fixed costs on devices and recurring costs on e-juices, are needed
- Better measures of e-cigarette use (frequency, intensity, device type) are needed





#### **ANDS Taxation**

# **Rationale for ANDS Taxation**

- Improve Public Health
  - Encourage switching from combusted to potentially 'less harmful' products
  - Prevent youth initiation
- Raise Revenue
  - Revenue replacement



## **U.S. State and Local Overview: ANDS Taxes**

- Minnesota was first state to implement a tax on e-cigarettes
- North Carolina tax recently implemented
- Kansas tax beginning July 2016
- Almost two dozen other states have discussed or are considering
- Local taxes in Petersburg and Juneau Alaska
  - Chicago tax proposed recently



#### **Minnesota ANDS Tax**

- Minnesota taxes e-cigarettes at 95% of the wholesale price by determining that they fall in the definition of a tobacco product
- Based on Department of Revenue decision that ecigarettes fit the state's definition of a tobacco product
- Public health community not actively involved in the decision



### Minnesota Language – Department of Revenue

- Minnesota Dept. of Revenue memo:
  - An electronic cigarette or e-cigarette is a device that simulates smoking tobacco. In Minnesota, e-cigarettes and e-juice which contain nicotine derived from tobacco meet the definition of a tobacco product found in (Minnesota Statutes, section 297F.01, subdivision 19).
  - E-Cigarettes are taxable.
  - E-cigarettes and e-juice are considered tobacco products and are subject to the Tobacco Tax, which is currently 95% of the wholesale cost of any product containing or derived from tobacco.
- Source: <u>http://www.revenue.state.mn.us/businesses/tobacco/Pages/e-Cig.aspx</u>



#### **Minnesota ANDS Tax**

- Minnesota tax based on value of the e-juice
  - But if sold as part of a package (e.g. reusable e-cigarettes or starter kits), tax applied to entire package
- Taxes collected from licensed 'distributors'
  - Retailers, vape shops can get list of licensed distributors from state tax authorities
- Active enforcement
  - Compliance checks of retailers, vape shops to determine if taxes have been paid
  - Untaxed products subject to seizure



#### **North Carolina ANDS Tax**

- Tax on vapor products adopted May 2014; effective July 1, 2015
  - RJR proposal; no public health input
- Five-cents per milliliter of 'consumable product'
  - "any nicotine liquid solution or other material that is depleted as vapor product is used"
- Taxes collected from licensed distributors
  - Retailers, vape shops can be licensed as distributors
  - Similar to approach used for OTP tax
- Relatively passive enforcement
  - Efforts to increase awareness of tax among distributors, retailers



#### Kansas ANDS Tax

- Tax adopted June 2015; effective July 1, 2016
  - Part of a larger tobacco tax measure that increased cigarette and other tobacco product taxes effective July 1, 2015
- Twenty cents per milliliter of 'consumable product'
- Implementation details unclear



# **Chicago Proposed ANDS Tax**

- Combined cigarette taxes in Chicago are highest in the U.S.
  - \$7.17 per pack; NYC second at \$6.85
  - No taxes on other tobacco products
- \$1.25 on devices
- \$0.25 per milliliter of nicotine containing solution



#### **International ANDS Taxes**

- Very few countries apply excise tax on ENDS
  - Togo taxed as a "derivative product" at 45% of price (WAEMU cap)
  - Republic of Korea taxes e-juice at equivalent of 1,799 won/milliliter (US\$1.65)
  - Italy 58.5% of retail price, but recently repealed
    - >50% drop in users; almost 40% drop in sales
- Subject to VAT in many countries
  - Although some exempt or apply lower rate for pharmaceutical use



# **Importance of Definitions**

- State statutory definitions of e-cigarettes can be categorized as\*:
  - <u>Inclusive</u>: e-cigarettes are included in the statutory definitions of tobacco products (9 states)
  - <u>Neutral</u>: e-cigarettes are defined separately from tobacco products in statute, but not exempted from future inclusion in the definition of tobacco products or further application of tobacco control-related statutes (14 states)
  - <u>Exempting</u>: e-cigarettes are explicitly exempt from being defined or treated as a tobacco product by statute (6 states)





#### **Structure of ANDS Taxes**


- Ad Valorem vs. Specific Excise Tax
  - Diversity and rapid evolution of products suggests ad valorem tax would be easier to administer
- Disadvantages of Ad Valorem Tax:
  - Valuation problems
  - Tax depends on industry pricing strategies
  - Larger price gaps between high, low priced products
  - High tax on devices could discourage use
- Advantages of Ad Valorem Tax:
  - Is not eroded by inflation



#### **Structure of ANDS Taxes**

- What to tax?
  - All products/components vs. e-juice?
  - Only products that contain nicotine?
  - All nicotine vs. nicotine derived from tobacco?
  - Differential taxes based on nicotine content?
- Where to collect tax?
  - Distributor vs. retailer?
  - Need for licensing





# Level of ANDS Taxation

# **Option A: Low ANDS prices**

- Apply little or no tax
  - NC approach
- Rationale:
  - Maximize switching
- Potential consequences:
  - Promotes initiation, gateway to combustible use
  - Encourages dual use



# **Option B: High e-cigarette price**

- Parity with combustible, OTP taxes
   MN approach
- Rationale:
  - Discourage youth initiation
  - Treat all tobacco products the same
  - Discourage dual use
- Potential consequences:
  - Discourage switching




# **Option C: Increase e-cigarette price**

- Tax e-cigarettes while increasing taxes on combustible tobacco products
  - Maintain or increase relative price of combustibles
  - KS approach (almost?)
- Rationale:
  - Maximize switching
  - Discourage dual use
  - Discourage initiation
  - Discourage combustible use



#### **Estimated Size of the Vapor Market**



Source: Presentation: Development of Premium E-Flavors and Market Analysis Note: Other Non-Tracked channels include tobacco-only outlets and other e-cig retail locations

#### **Potential ENDS Tax Revenues**


- Assume own-price elasticity of -1.5 based on published Nielsen data analysis
- Assume same elasticity in other market segments
- Impose tax that raises prices for all tracked sales by given percentage
- Calculate new sales and tax revenues
  - CA:
    - 20% tax revenues around \$18.7 million
    - 40% tax revenues around \$21.4 million



# **Recommended Approach:**

- Tax e-cigarettes while increasing taxes on cigarettes and other tobacco products
  - Maintain or increase relative price of combustibles
  - Maximize switching while discouraging initiation and dual use
  - Use revenues to support prevention and cessation programs







# Implications for New Zealand's Smokefree 2025 Goal


- Uniform specific cigarette excise tax
- Comparable taxes on roll-your-own tobacco
- Regular tax increases to keep pace with inflation
- Periodic significant increases in taxes



Price of Cheapest Brand Relative to Most Popular Brand, 2014







Sources: EIU, World Bank and OECD

Smoking Prevalence and Cigarette Prices New Zealand, 1990-2013, Inflation Adjusted



Sources: EIU, World Bank and OECD

- Sizable increases in cigarette and other tobacco product taxes
  - In addition to regular inflation adjustments
  - Large enough to minimize industry ability to absorb
  - Less frequent and larger increases rather than series of phased in smaller increases
- Recent research from U.S. suggests impact of future increases may be greater than past



- Use revenues to support comprehensive tobacco control program
  - Support for cessation among current smokers
  - Mass media prevention campaigns
  - Particular need for targeted efforts to reduce disparities
  - Enhances public support for further tax increases, including among current tobacco users
- Experiences from U.S. and elsewhere show that comprehensive programs highly effective in adding to effects of tax increase



- Adopt/strengthen tobacco control policies
  - Tax increases are key component of comprehensive tobacco control strategy
  - Other policy changes reinforce tax increases and reach tobacco users who may be less responsive to tax/price increases
  - Plain packaging would be logical next step



- Implement a harm reduction approach
  - ANDS subject to strong regulation
  - High taxes on ANDS to discourage youth
     uptake and reinitiation among former smokers
  - Taxes below combustible product taxes to encourage substitution among highly addicted smokers
  - Supported by restrictions on access, marketing, and use in public spaces/workplaces




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fjc@uic.edu





# Tobacco Taxes & Tobacco Use

#### What We Know

- Increases in taxes that increase cigarette prices:
  - Decrease overall cigarette smoking
  - Reduce adult prevalence by inducing cessation induces current smokers to quit,
  - Deter re-initiation
  - Prevent youth uptake
  - Reduce consumption among continuing users
  - Lead to other changes in tobacco use behaviors
    - Brand/product choices, purchasing behaviors, tax avoidance, etc.



#### **Cigarette Price & Consumption** Hungary, 1990-2011, Inflation Adjusted




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
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#### Sources: EIU, ERC, and World Bank


#### **Adult Prevalence & Price, Brazil**



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


#### Cigarette Prices and Cessation US States & DC, 2009




Source: BRFSS, Tax Burden on Tobacco, 2010, and author's calculations

#### Cigarette Price & Youth Smoking Prevalence High School Seniors, United States, 1991-2013



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#### **Price, Consumption & Lung Cancer, France**






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#### What We Need to Know


- How the effect of price increases changes as prices increase (potential nonlinear impact)
- Whether the impact of a price increase differs by the size of price increases (asymmetric impact)
- How opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion affect price elasticity estimates



#### State Cigarette Excise Tax Rates – February 2015



#### **Estimated State Cigarette 'Importing' and 'Exporting', 2010-11**




# **Nonlinearities in Price Elasticity**


- Two sets of analyses in progress:
  - Aggregate analysis of state level tax-paid cigarette sales
  - Individual level analysis of cigarette smoking prevalence and consumption using data from multiple waves of the Tobacco Use Supplement to the Current Population Survey
    - Also emphasize how opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion can
       affect estimates of price elasticity
- All analyses control for other tobacco control policies and variety of other factors that influence cigarette demand



#### **Results – Aggregate Data**



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



# Implications for New Zealand's Smokefree 2025 Goal


- Uniform specific cigarette excise tax
- Comparable taxes on roll-your-own tobacco
- Regular tax increases to keep pace with inflation
- Periodic significant increases in taxes



Price of Cheapest Brand Relative to Most Popular Brand, 2014







Sources: EIU, World Bank and OECD

Smoking Prevalence and Cigarette Prices New Zealand, 1990-2013, Inflation Adjusted



Sources: EIU, World Bank and OECD

- Sizable increases in cigarette and other tobacco product taxes
  - In addition to regular inflation adjustments
  - Large enough to minimize industry ability to absorb
  - Less frequent and larger increases rather than series of phased in smaller increases
- Recent research from U.S. suggests impact of future increases may be greater than past



- Use revenues to support comprehensive tobacco control program
  - Support for cessation among current smokers
  - Mass media prevention campaigns
  - Particular need for targeted efforts to reduce disparities
  - Enhances public support for further tax increases, including among current tobacco users
- Experiences from U.S. and elsewhere show that comprehensive programs highly effective in adding to effects of tax increase



- Adopt/strengthen tobacco control policies
  - Tax increases are key component of comprehensive tobacco control strategy
  - Other policy changes reinforce tax increases and reach tobacco users who may be less responsive to tax/price increases
  - Plain packaging would be logical next step



- Implement a harm reduction approach
  - ANDS subject to strong regulation
  - High taxes on ANDS to discourage youth
     uptake and reinitiation among former smokers
  - Taxes below combustible product taxes to encourage substitution among highly addicted smokers
  - Supported by restrictions on access, marketing, and use in public spaces/workplaces



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fjc@uic.edu

